

21 March 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Consumer Reaction to OCI Publications

During the OCI survey interviews were conducted with representatives of other Departments and Agencies to obtain a candid appraisal of the value and use of OCI's current intelligence publications. The results of these interviews are summarized below.

### 1. White House Staff

a. Colonel Andrew Goodpaster, White House Staff Secretary was interviewed on 4 March 1955. He receives the Current Intelligence Bulletin and the Current Intelligence Weekly Review on a continuing basis and is one of four members of the White House Staff who are cleared to receive COMINT material.

b. He uses both of these publications in his periodic briefings of the President. It is his custom to select three to four items from the Bulletin over a period from seven to ten days and from two to three items from each Weekly Review for this purpose. Although the President does not read these publications personally, the briefings are conducted from the documents themselves and are occasionally shown to him for ready reference to the graphic material or in response to his natural interest in the type of intelligence document produced by the Agency. Colonel Goodpaster indicated that he had heard the President refer to CIA items on several occasions in both NSC and Cabinet meetings. Both publications are of considerable interest and value to the White House Staff. Colonel Goodpaster stated that the Agency "was to be complimented" on its efforts in this respect.

c. In addition to the Bulletin and Weekly Review, the White House Staff receives the Secret daily Digest which was utilized by Mr. Bryce Harlow as background material for his work on the President's speeches. The Staff also receives an oral briefing every other week by an OCI representative which is regularly attended by Governor Adams, General Cutler and Colonel Goodpaster. These briefings are extremely well received and Colonel Goodpaster stated that [REDACTED], OCI Briefing Officer, was to be commended for the content and conduct of these briefings.

### 2. National Security Council Secretariat

a. Mr. James Lay, Executive Secretary of the NSC, and Mr. Everett Gleason, of the NSC Secretariat, were interviewed on 3 March 1955.

b. The NSC Secretariat receives the daily Bulletin, the daily Digest and the Current Intelligence Weekly Review on a continuing basis. The Bulletin is reviewed by Mr. Gleason who refers significant items to the attention of Mr. Lay and General Cutler and is generally used as a "check list" of important developments. Other members of the Secretariat receive the Current Intelligence Digest. The Weekly Review is hastily scanned by Mr. Gleason and is used for general background information.

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c. Mr. Lay indicated that the principal need for a weekly publication was to anticipate critical situations and plan accordingly. In general, the NSC Secretariat finds the daily Bulletin and the Weekly Review useful and of value in that they may alert them to the need for an NIE or touch on a policy problem under consideration.

### 3. The Department of Defense

a. General M. Erskine, Colonel B. Smith, and Mr. William A. Smith of the Office of the Secretary of Defense were interviewed on 3 March 1955.

b. The Office of the Secretary of Defense receives the Current Intelligence Bulletin, the Current Intelligence Digest, and the Weekly Review on a continuing basis. The Bulletin is reviewed by a member of General Erskine's staff and significant items are referred to his attention. The Digest and the Weekly are used by staff members as general background information. Although there is not an established, formal system of briefing Mr. Wilson, Secretary of Defense, information in the Agency's current intelligence publications is used for spot informal briefings.

c. In general, General Erskine finds these publications of interest and value to his staff, since they provide him with opinions on political and economic situations outside the normal purview of the Service Agencies. Of particular value is that portion of the Weekly pertaining to trends. General Erskine stated that it was difficult to brief the Secretary of Defense implying that the Secretary lacks a broad understanding of world affairs. He further stated that Secretary Willson relied heavily on the Director's briefings of the NSC.

### 4. Joint Chiefs of Staff

a. Admiral Edwin T. L. Layton, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, and Captain Malpass and Commander Herschfeld of his Staff were interviewed on 25 February 1955.

b. Admiral Layton sees the Current Intelligence Bulletin and the Weekly Review on a continuing basis, and in general, considers them of distinct value. He stated that they have "a definite role in the intelligence scheme." The Bulletin and the Weekly are used as a source of intelligence items for inclusion in a daily two-page intelligence memorandum for Admiral Radford. After review by Admiral Layton and his Staff, copies of these publications are routed to senior staffs and committee chiefs within the JCS.

c. Admiral Layton is of the opinion that the Bulletin should receive more careful coordination with Defense components when military items of significance are involved. He was particularly pleased and impressed by the quality of the graphic aids in the Weekly publications.

5. Department of the Army

a. Major General R. A. Schow, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, was interviewed initially and arranged for a panel discussion with senior intelligence personnel on his Staff.

b. The Army receives all the Agency's current intelligence publications. General Schow was quite complimentary of the Agency current intelligence publications in general and personally reviews the Bulletin. CIA current intelligence publications provide a substantial contribution to G-2's oral briefing of the Army Chief of Staff. Both COMINT and other publications are disseminated within G-2 for the benefit of substantive analysts and to major commands overseas.

c. Although there was a distinct impression created during the panel discussion that G-2 personnel regard certain CIA articles as having "alarmist" overtones, there was no question as to their general value, particularly because of their coverage of State material. There was general satisfaction expressed as to the cooperation of Agency analysts in coordinating specific military items, and the few instances where they had noted a lack of coordination were of no serious consequence.

6. Office of Naval Intelligence

a. On 4 March 1955, a panel discussion was held with the following ONI officials: Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral H.C. Daniel; Assistant Director of Intelligence Production, Captain R. N. McFarlane; Chief, Foreign Branch, Captain H. C. Moore; and two members of the Operational Intelligence Branch.

b. ONI receives all of CIA's current intelligence publications on a continuing basis and considers them generally to be timely and of considerable value. Senior officials in the Navy do not read the Bulletin or the Weekly Operations and the Secretary of the Navy. They cited the fact that both the Bulletin and the Weekly contained State cables (SS) which they were not permitted to use in ONI publications, but can extract from CIA material once it has been published by the Agency (OCI has specific authority in writing from the Department of State to use State cables in its publications. "Info only" cables must be cleared in advance with the State Secretariat.) In general, coordination on naval matters is considered satisfactory and they expressed appreciation of the care taken by the Agency to seek their assistance on such items.

c. Although the ONI interview was scheduled in connection with the OCI survey only, ONI had the following specific complaints on other matters:

(1) The photographs obtained and disseminated by the Agency are too highly classified.

(2) ORR is getting closer and closer to ONI's area of responsibility in its studies on naval production.

(3) CIA/RR-42, The Shipbuilding Industry in East Germany, 1 October 1954, went too far into the Navy's field.

(4) OSI's special intelligence publications reveal no real analysis and are little more than a re-hash of NSA material.

(5) They complained of the lack of information on the sources of "priority disseminations" of DD/P reports and cited specific examples.

NOTE: At the conclusion of the discussion, Captain Moore stated that he had heard more criticism of CIA during this discussion than during ONI meetings with the Doolittle and Clark Committees.

#### 7. Department of the Air Force

a. Major General John R. Samford, Director of Intelligence, Department of the Air Force was interviewed on 25 February 1955.

b. The Department of the Air Force receives all of the Agency's current intelligence publications on a continuing basis. They are disseminated throughout the Directorate of Intelligence and are used extensively as a source of material for daily oral and written briefing of the Chief of the Air Staff and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Air. General Samford reviews the Bulletin daily and occasionally has the opportunity to read the Weekly Review. He was lavish in his praise of the scope, content and usefulness of these publications and stated that the Directorate depended almost exclusively on these Agency publications to supplement Air Force reporting through its own channels.

c. The only adverse comment made by General Samford involved the length of the new Weekly Review. He believed that its excessive length has limited its usefulness to senior officials who have little time to devote to the review of intelligence publications.

#### 8. The Department of State

a. Interviews with officials of the Department of State were held on 25 February 1955 and were arranged by Mr. Park Armstrong, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence. This schedule included discussions with Mr. Polyzoides, Chief of the Special Projects Staff; Mr. Howe, Mr. Armstrong's Deputy; Mr. Furness, Staff Assistant to Mr. Armstrong; Mr. Trezie, Deputy Chief, OIR; Mr. McAfee, Current Intelligence Coordinator, OIR; and Mr. W. K. Scott, Director Executive Secretariat.

b. The Department of State, receives all Agency current intelligence publications on a continuing basis. The Bulletin serves two purposes: (1) it serves as a check on items which Mr. Armstrong's Staff refer to him; (2) Mr. Armstrong refers to the Bulletin as a partial source of material for

his morning briefings of the Secretary. The code-word Weekly Review is of more value to the OIR since it goes into greater detail. The Secret version of the Weekly is of particular value to OIR since most of the personnel do not have COMINT clearances. The Undersecretary of State, Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr., personally reviews the daily Bulletin.

c. In the initial meeting with Mr. Armstrong, he indicated that if he and the personnel of his staff were not quoted, the Agency representative would probably obtain very frank comments on the Agency's current intelligence publications. In general, the comments by personnel interviewed were quite derogatory in nature and are summarized as follows:

(1) Current Intelligence Bulletin: It was indicated by Mr. Armstrong that the Bulletin would be of no loss to State if discontinued. It is often considered superficial and inaccurate and much of it is based on State Department cables which had already been acted upon by the area desks in State. It was stated that the code-word classification was over-used and at least one issue of the Bulletin did not contain any code-word items.

(2) The Current Intelligence Weekly Review: Although the consolidation of the Weekly was considered desirable it was the opinion of Mr. Polyzoides that it was now entirely too long if designed for senior officials. The code-word version of the Weekly is of some value to Mr. Armstrong. The Secret version, although disseminated in OIR is not read by Mr. Trezie, the Deputy Chief of OIR, "because he had more important things to do." The latter, as well as Mr. Armstrong, emphasized the existence of competition between OIR and OCI and felt there should be much closer cooperation and coordination.

(3) OCI Handbooks: Mr. Trezie felt that the Handbooks were superficial and duplicated the NIS.

(4) General: Mr. Polyzoides stated that the short deadlines in OCI were reflected in the quality of the items and he referred to several inaccuracies which had come to his attention. He deplored the tendency toward "flashy" reporting in the nature of Newsweek and Time. In addition, he felt that there was too much of a tendency to draw significance from one fragmentary piece of intelligence and use it as an excuse for unwarranted speculation.

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick  
Inspector General

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